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Introduction
In the conventional password scheme, every user should register a pair of user identification id and password w with the computer server C so that it is employed for later login. Then, after finishing the registration in computer server C , the user id and the password w are stored inside the password file. However, if a hacker gets access to the computer server C , he can easily obtain the secret information of a user. So, to improve and fix the shortcomings of the scheme many authors suggested improvements [1, 2, 3] in order to defend a password obtained by the hackers. The improvements are as follow:
1. During the use of secure one-way hash function password w protection can be attained and saved within the password file. 2. Use the public-key cryptography to send the passwords by the encrypted methods in order to obstruct the hackers from easily obtaining the password w . Even if the hacker knows the inside of a password file, he cannot definitely obtain the password w . Because the hacker cannot obtain the private key, just the accepted receiver can decrypt the received encrypted message. However, these improved password schemes also have some difficulties:
1. Hackers can use the one-way hash function to secure his password w as well as to attach it to the password file. 2. If several users enter the linked network, the password file should be expanded too, so the organization of the password file and the loading for servers will become difficult. 3. Hackers can prevent the authorized user from altering password. By using the above security, in 1996 Wang and Chang suggested a password scheme that is embedded in a smart card. It lets the user choose by picking a password through registration. Also, the computer server C does not need a password file before authenticating the retrieve message. This scheme combined the signature suggested by Elgamal [4] with a signature using identity from Shamir scheme [5] . In the field of security scheme, it was using the polynomial factoring and the discrete logarithm problem and protected the repetitive trail attack.
In 2001, Chan and Chang [6] indicated that the Wang and Chang scheme cannot stop repetitive trial attacks, when the hacker reported the operative logged on documents besides forging a timestamp On the subsequently login to the system, the hacker can then resend before login to the system for service.
In 2008, Yoon et al. [7] examined the Wang and Chang scheme. It was reported that with the continuation of forged attack and offline guessing forged attack that result from the lack of factual identity authentication for the user, the hacker can obtain the timestamp and after that he can easily login by pretending to be an accepted user. In the password guessing attack, the hacker can estimate the password and verify until the authentication is successful in the timeframe chosen by the polynomial, then the hacker can obtain the accepted user password.
In 2010, Al Sakib Khan Pathan [8] analyzed the Wang and Chang scheme He showed that the scheme which so far have been thought to be intractable is still flawed, in spite of their later improvements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we first review the Shen et al. scheme in Section 2, and present our impersonation attacks against the scheme. In Section 3, we study Wang and Chang scheme and establish a protection embrasure instead. When the hacker can implement the modular exponentiation in both sides of the authentication formulas and in intercepting the login request, then the hacker can create new logon request and successfully login to the computer server C Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 4.
Review of Shen et al. Scheme
The Shen et al. password scheme [9] includes three phases: registration, login, and authentication. We now review each phase as follows.
Registration Phase
Suppose that a server C has the RSA scheme, the steps of the initialization phase are as follows:
1. select randomly two large prime numbers p and q are equally likely. 
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Login Phase
When the user A wants to login into the server C , he must do the following:
1 for a random timestamp 1 T with probability of e / 1 . This implies that to successfully amount an attack, a hacker only needs to intercept a dozen of valid login messages on average if e is a prime less than 20.
Actually, , it seems infeasible to amount this attack since each single run of the attacking algorithm with success probability only about 80 2  , a negligible quantity. This is the reason why we have to assume that e should be a small number in this attack.
Review of Wang and Chang Scheme
There are four phases in Wang and Chang smart card typed password scheme. These phases are: initialization phase, registration phase, login phase and verification phase. Suppose that the computer server C issues a tailored smart card to user once entering the system. Firstly, the computer server C sets up the initiation phase which is as follows:
Initialization Phase
By using RSA public key encryption scheme [10], the steps of the initialization phase are as follows:
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Registration Phase
The steps of the registration phase are as follows:
Step 1: The user A Assume that the new user A registers with the system. Then he should do the following:
1. select the identification id 2. select the password w 3. send identification id and password w to the computer server C .
Step 2: The Computer server C
The steps of the algorithm after receiving the registering information are as follows:
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Login Phase
The steps of the login phase are as follows:
Step 1: The user A If the user needs to enter the system, he should do the following:
1. inserts the smart card into the reader 2. enters id and w from the screen. 3. generates an arbitrary integer u . 
Authentication Phase
The steps of the authentication phase are as follows:
Step According to the above correction, we can say that implementing the modular exponentiation in both sides of the authentication formulas, the computer server C can authenticate its request and takes in as accepted. However, if a hacker login with appropriate request he can create new logon request as well as logon to the computer server C .
Conclusions
We indicated that there is a security leak at Wang and Chang scheme which is that the hacker can implement modular exponentiation in both sides of authentication formulas, also after intercepting the login request, he can create a new login request and successfully logon to the computer server C . Therefore, Wang and Chang scheme cannot give sufficient security and is not appropriate for practical achievement of the scheme.
